

STATEMENT
OF
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS)
ROBERT H. PELLETREAU, JR.
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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STATEMENT

IN DEFERENCE TO MY RESPECTED COLLEAGUE BOB PECK, I DO NOT WISH TO MAKE A SEPARATE FORMAL STATEMENT, BUT I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE A FEW MINUTES TO TRACE A SHORT HISTORY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION'S QUITE SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE AND BUILD A VERY POSITIVE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT, AFTER YEARS OF INACTIVITY DURING THE 1970S. I AM READY TO ANSWER THE QUESTIONS POSED IN ADVANCE BY THE COMMITTEE, AND I AM PREPARED TO ASSIST MR. PECK IN RESPONDING TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

THE RATIONALE FOR OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND OUR ENTIRE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN IS WELL KNOWN. OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH PAKISTAN IS DESIGNED TO MODERNIZE ITS ARMED FORCES, TO GIVE THOSE FORCES BETTER EQUIPMENT AND OVERALL CAPABILITY TO DETER POTENTIAL SOVIET ADVENTURISM FROM AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY PROVOCATIVE AND OFTEN DESTRUCTIVE AIR INCURSIONS OF PAKISTANI AIRSPACE AND TERRITORY.

IN 1983, SHORTLY AFTER BOTH GOVERNMENTS APPROVED AND BEGAN TO IMPLEMENT OUR CURRENT FIVE YEAR SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER PROPOSED THE FORMATION OF A JOINT SENIOR-LEVEL FORUM WITH PAKISTAN TO DISCUSS THE EVOLUTION OF THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND OTHER RELEVANT DEFENSE ISSUES. THE SMOOTH IMPLEMENTATION AND

DEVELOPMENT OF THIS CONSULTATIVE GROUP FORUM INTO A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION OF ISSUES IS A CLEAR EXAMPLE OF THE RENEWED STRENGTH OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ONE OF THE MOST PROFESSIONAL MILITARIES IN THE ENTIRE REGION. WE MEET ON A SEMI-ANNUAL BASIS AND EXPECT TO HOLD OUR NEXT SESSION LATER THIS SPRING. X

THROUGH THIS FORUM WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ENGAGE THE SENIOR DEFENSE OFFICIALS IN PAKISTAN IN A DEBATE ON THE DIRECTIONS THEY SEE THEIR MILITARY TAKING IN FUTURE YEARS, AND THEIR THINKING ON HOW THEY PLAN TO INTEGRATE OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE EQUIPMENT INTO THOSE PROJECTIONS. COMPARISONS OF VIEWS ON REGIONAL POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS ARE ALSO EXCHANGED DURING THESE MEETINGS. INITIATIVES ARE EXPLORED ON A VARIETY OF RELATED TOPICS, AMONG THEM THE PRESSING NEED PAKISTAN HAS HAD SINCE 1983 FOR AN EFFECTIVE AIR DEFENSE NETWORK ALONG THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN BORDER. I WILL RETURN TO THIS IN DETAIL.

PAKISTAN PROVIDES SIZEABLE CONTINGENTS OF PROFESSIONAL SOLDIERS TO MANY MODERATE ARAB NEIGHBORS IN THE PERSIAN GULF. TO A COUNTRY, THOSE GOVERNMENTS ARE IMPRESSED WITH THE ATTITUDES AND MILITARY EDUCATION THESE PAKISTANI PROFESSIONALS POSSESS. PAKISTAN ALSO ALLOWS MILITARY STUDENTS FROM MANY OF THESE GULF COUNTRIES TO ATTEND TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL COURSES IN PAKISTAN'S VARIOUS MILITARY INSTITUTIONS. WE APPLAUD BOTH DEVELOPMENTS: PAKISTAN IS ABLE TO ARGUE FOR MODERATION AND RESTRAINT ON SPECIFIC EXTREMIST ARAB POSITIONS IN MANY

INFLUENTIAL ISLAMIC AND NONALIGNED ORGANIZATIONS, TO INCLUDE THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE.

THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS FORCED PAKISTAN TO DEAL WITH A SITUATION UNLIKE ANY IN ITS FORTY-YEAR HISTORY: THE BRUTAL SUBJUGATION OF A NEIGHBORING MUSLIM COUNTRY AND THE RELATED CAMPAIGN OF CLEAR INTIMIDATION AGAINST PAKISTANI TERRITORY AND CIVILIANS. IT IS HARDLY A SECRET THAT PAKISTAN FOUND ITSELF ILL-EQUIPPED TO PROVIDE AN IMMEDIATE AND SATISFACTORY AIR DEFENSE OF AN ILL-DEFINED BORDER. THAT BORDER IS NOT ONLY OVER 1200 MILES LONG BUT ALSO CONTAINS A VARIETY OF TOPOGRAPHY THAT RANGES FROM HIGH ARID DESERT IN THE SOUTHWEST TO TWO OF THE WORLD'S HIGHEST MOUNTAIN RANGES, THE HIMALAYAS AND THE HINDU KUSH, IN THE NORTHWEST. SUPERIMPOSING PAKISTAN OVER A MAP OF THE U.S. WOULD COVER THE EASTERN STATES FROM PENNSYLVANIA TO NORTHERN FLORIDA AND SOUTHWEST TO THE LOUISIANA-ARKANSAS BORDER. IT IS NOT A SMALL COUNTRY.

IN 1984, AS A LOGICAL OUTGROWTH OF THIS CONSULTATIVE GROUP, PAKISTAN REQUESTED A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY AIR DEFENSE SURVEY, CARRIED OUT BY EXPERTS FROM THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND THE JOINT STAFF. PAKISTAN THEN REQUESTED A STUDY, DONE IN 1985, TO MAKE SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHAT PAKISTAN COULD DO TO PROVIDE A SATISFACTORY AIR DEFENSE NETWORK ALONG THE AFGHAN BORDER. AGAIN EXPERTS FROM THE PENTAGON AND FROM CENTRAL COMMAND VISITED PAKISTAN AND CONDUCTED A PROFESSIONAL APPRAISAL AND MADE SEVERAL SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS, EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE SITUATION ALONG THE AFGHAN BORDER.

VIRTUALLY ALL THOSE RECOMMENDATIONS, ESPECIALLY NEAR-TERM AND INTERMEDIATE ONES, PAKISTAN IMPLEMENTED. ON ONE RECOMMENDATION, HOWEVER, BOTH THE U.S. AND PAKISTAN WERE IN TOTAL AGREEMENT, IN SPITE OF THE EXORBITANT COST: THE ONLY EFFECTIVE, LONG-RANGE DETERRENT TO CONTINUING CROSS-BORDER PROVOCATIONS FROM AFGHANISTAN WAS THE ACQUISITION OF SOME SORT OF AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING PLATFORM -- OR AEW.

PAKISTAN ALSO BEGAN TO REALIZE THAT REGARDLESS OF ITS PROGRESS ON AIR DEFENSE, THE PROBLEM WAS WORSENING AND WOULD CONTINUE TO, AS LONG AS THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO FORCE A CHANGE TO PAKISTAN'S PRINCIPLED SUPPORT OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. AIR VIOLATIONS IN 1986 TRIPLED THOSE IN 1985, WITH MATCHING INCREASES IN NUMBERS OF SERIOUS INCIDENTS AND IN CASUALTIES AND DESTRUCTION. AS AN ASIDE, NUMBERS IN THE FIRST TWO MONTHS OF THIS YEAR HAVE ALREADY EXCEEDED THE NUMBER FOR ALL OF 1985. LAST WEEKEND'S AIR ATTACKS ALONG THE BORDER, AIMED BOTH AT PAKISTANI VILLAGES AND AT REFUGEE CAMPS, LEFT AN ESTIMATED ONE HUNDRED PEOPLE KILLED...A TIMELY REMINDER OF THE GRAVITY OF THIS ISSUE.

AS ANOTHER DIRECT OUTGROWTH OF OUR JOINT DISCUSSIONS AND IN SMALLER MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER, THE PAKISTANIS APPROVED THE FORMATION LAST YEAR OF A JOINT STUDY GROUP TO LOOK AT ALTERNATIVE AEW SYSTEMS. NOT ONLY WAS AN AEW AIRCRAFT A SPECIFIC MILITARY REQUIREMENT, IT HAD NOW OBVIOUSLY BECOME A PRESSING POLITICAL ISSUE FOR THE NEW CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT: COULD

PRIME MINISTER JUNEJO DEMONSTRATE ANY INTEREST IN THE SUFFERING AND DESTRUCTION THAT THESE INCURSIONS WERE CAUSING? THE PRIME MINISTER ARGUED FORCEFULLY LAST YEAR IN WASHINGTON THAT WITHOUT OUR HELP, HIS GOVERNMENT SIMPLY COULD NOT COPE EFFECTIVELY WITH THESE INTRUSIONS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED SUFFERING WERE HIGH.

THE JOINT STUDY GROUP VALIDATED THE MILITARY NEED, RESTUDIED THE TERRAIN AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE INTENDED USE, JOINTLY REFINED REALISTIC CAPABILITIES REQUIRED, AND LOOKED AT A NUMBER OF RELEASABLE VERSIONS, ONLY TWO OF WHICH ARE EXISTING AIRCRAFT. ONE IS A RELEASABLE VERSION OF THE E2C HAWKEYE MADE BY GRUMMAN, ONE A RELEASABLE VERSION OF THE E3A SENTRY MADE BY BOEING. X

THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS THEREFORE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE A RELEASABLE VERSION OF AN AEW AIRCRAFT TO PAKISTAN. TO DO OTHERWISE, IN THE FACE OF SUCH BLATANT PROVOCATION, LOSS OF LIFE, AND DESTRUCTIVE RESULTS, WOULD BE TO DESERT A CLOSE FRIEND AT ITS MOST DESPERATE HOUR OF NEED.

LET ME REPEAT WHAT MANY OTHERS HAVE SAID RECENTLY: NO COUNTRY HAS DONE MORE, OR SUFFERED MORE, TO SUPPORT THE HEROIC AFGHAN PEOPLE, THAN PAKISTAN. WITHOUT OUR AID, PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE LITTLE CHOICE BUT TO SEEK AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIETS AND FOREVER VIEW US AS AN UNRELIABLE SECURITY GUARANTOR.

CONTRARY TO THE SIMPLISTIC ASSERTIONS OF MANY CRITICS, OUR ARMS SALES HAVE NOT SET OFF A MAJOR ARMS RACE ON THE SUBCONTINENT. MUCH OF THE CURRENT EQUIPMENT PAKISTAN HAS IS WOEFULLY, I REPEAT, WOEFULLY OBSOLETE. OUR SECURITY ASSISTANCE EFFORTS HAVE NOT ALTERED, AND ARE UNLIKELY EVER TO ALTER, THE BASIC BALANCE OF FORCES WITH INDIA. INDIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUPERIOR TO PAKISTAN IN NEARLY EVERY MAJOR MILITARY END ITEM, INCLUDING AN IMPRESSIVE INDIAN ARRAY OF SOPHISTICATED SOVIET-MODEL ARMOR AND AIRCRAFT, PROVIDED BY THE SOVIETS OR CO-PRODUCED FROM SOVIET DESIGNS. INDIAN NAVAL COMBATANTS ALSO OUTNUMBER THOSE OF PAKISTAN BY A LARGE MARGIN.

WE ALSO HAVE ALLOTTED THE AMOUNT OF \$915-THOUSAND FOR FY 88 IMET (INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING) FOR PAKISTAN THAT ALLOWS ITS MILITARY SERVICES TO SEND QUALIFIED MILITARY OFFICERS TO A VARIETY OF MILITARY COURSES AT SEVERAL U.S. MILITARY BASES. THESE STUDENTS EVENTUALLY ASSUME RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT POSITIONS IN PAKISTAN, HELPING FOSTER CONTINUING APPRECIATION NOT ONLY FOR THE U.S. MILITARY BUT ALSO FOR VALUES THAT OUR COUNTRY CONSIDERS PARAMOUNT IN ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHERS.

I WELCOME YOUR QUESTIONS.

QUESTION: Haven't our sales to Pakistan set off a major arms race and led to the current aggravated tensions on the India-Pakistan border?

ANSWER: Our arms sales have not set off a major arms race. Much of the current equipment Pakistan has is woefully obsolete. Our security assistance efforts have not altered, and are unlikely ever to alter, the basic balance of forces with India. India will continue to be superior to Pakistan in nearly every major military end item, including sophisticated Soviet-model armor and aircraft, provided by the Soviets or co-produced from Soviet designs. Indian naval combatants also outnumber those of Pakistan by a large margin.

The current aggravated tensions on the border arose from a very large-scale exercise the Indian Army is conducting, and one that the Pakistanis have expressed concerns about for months. Tactical movements on both sides were misinterpreted during last month, and tensions increased unnecessarily. Incorrect conclusions led to a political and press outcry, especially in New Delhi. We applaud the skillful and peaceful negotiations that both governments have undertaken to defuse the tensions and withdraw units from the border.

Question: AEW: Discuss various merits and cost comparisons of ground-based radar, tethered balloons, Hawkeyes, E3A AWACS, and other systems, with particular interest in degree to which any of these systems can operate effectively in environment similar to that along Pak-Afghan border.

Response: Any discussion of early warning radar systems for Pakistan has to start out with an understanding of the size of Pakistan, its physical geography, and limitations of different radar systems that would have to operate there. The distances involved are significant when one considers that the Afghan air force can choose the time and place to attack anywhere along that border, while Pakistan must be able to respond, not knowing precisely when or where the attack will occur. Pakistan shares a border with Afghanistan that is eleven hundred miles long and ranges from high desert and five-to-seven-thousand-foot peaks along the southern sector, to average terrain along the northern sector of twelve-to-fifteen thousand feet, with many peaks in the Hindu Kush easily exceeding 20-thousand feet.

Along the southern sector, a combination of ground-based radars, already in Pakistan's possession, and aerostat radars, a purchase recommended by successive U.S. military survey teams, would improve early warning and aircraft control. Aerostat radars cost in the neighborhood of \$15 to \$20 million each.

The only solution to the air surveillance of the northern and far more mountainous sector north of Peshawar, where many of the air intrusions occur, is the deployment of an airborne radar system capable of patrolling the area at a sufficient height to overcome the terrain masking of the mountains and to see down the valleys that approach the border. The main requirement for the radar in this airborne system is to be able to detect aircraft in mountainous terrain. Both the E-2C Hawkeye and the E3A AWACS meet the requirement for this sector. The E-3A can maintain altitudes in excess of 27-thousand feet with one of its four engines out. The E-2C cannot maintain enough altitude to allow it to escape safely from much of the terrain in the area, should the aircraft lose power in one of its two engines.

The package cost for a recommended four-aircraft E-2C procurement is slightly less than half a billion dollars. For a three-aircraft E-3A procurement, the cost is estimated to be around \$850 million.

Question: AEW: How soon could a fully-functioning AEW system be delivered to Pakistan, once decision to provide such a system was made? What about making delivery of AEW system conditional upon continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan?

Response: The earliest delivery date for a procurement of the E-2C would be 2 1/2 years from the date of agreement/order. For the E-3A, the earliest date would be 3 years.

While in concept the delivery conditional on continued Soviet occupation sounds attractive, in practice it is unrealistic. The Soviets have shown no willingness to withdraw; rather, their constant introduction of more sophisticated, heavier types of firepower and their dedicated upgrade of military facilities in Afghanistan belie, for the time being at least, their hints of an immediate settlement.

Such conditionality would be a disastrous signal to send to the Pakistanis as well as the Soviets. For Pakistan, it would show that the United States is even more impatient than ever to renege on promises of support and security. It would completely undo the professional efforts of serious military experts since 1984 in devising a coordinated air defense scheme for Pakistan. No one in 1984 could have predicted the severity of the increased numbers of air intrusions of 1986 and 1987, and therefore the increased need for an effective early warning requirement. This Soviet-inspired intimidation has caused Pakistan's senior leaders to decide on the costly, long-term recommendation of our military experts: the acquisition of an airborne early warning system like the E-2C or the E-3A.

Conversely, the Soviets would take great delight in our imposing any conditionality on the sale. Within hours of such a legislated requirement, the Soviets could easily direct their admirable propaganda and political efforts towards reworked flimsy peace feelers, yet continuing to pursue their goals in Afghanistan. The opportunity for continued stalling is obvious.

Meanwhile, the fighting and suffering would go on. For eight years the Soviets have defied the civilized world in Afghanistan. For eight years the heroic Afghan people and their Muslim brethren in Pakistan have borne the indescribable tragedy of that invasion. For eight years the Soviets have stalled, looking for the right combination of quisling government and coercion that will cower the Afghan people and their Pakistani neighbors into docile acceptance of a permanent Soviet presence in Afghanistan.

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Question: What is current military situation on Indo-Pak border? What are prospects for war, either from deliberate decision or through inadvertence?

Response: There has been a staged pullback from the border of units agreed to under the diplomatic talks early last month in New Delhi. Tension has definitely dissipated, and there has been a return to virtual normalcy. Major Indian Army units that are involved in their training exercise "Brass Tacks" are continuing to carry out the latter phases of this exercise near the border.

But the skillful negotiations, the renewed willingness to communicate at all levels, and the symbolism behind President Zia's recent attendance at an India-Pakistani cricket match highlight the sincerity both sides have to keeping tensions minimized. The prospects for war through inadvertence are far more remote than they were this January during the misunderstandings and attendant troop movements.

Question: Tests of the E2C Hawkeye were held in the U.S. in late January and early February. What were the results of these tests? Have Pakistanis given any indication of their reaction to the tests? Are there any plans to flight-test the Hawkeye in Pakistan?

What would you think of making their sale conditional on presidential certification of adequate testing in-country?

(Or in alternate form: Please comment on the wisdom and probable impact of: stipulating that before delivery, any AEW system must be field-tested in Pakistan and that the US President must report to Congress that a threat to Pakistan's security exists and that the AEW system in question is appropriate to countering that threat.)

Response: Ground demonstrations for the Navy E2C system were provided earlier this year for a small group of Pakistan Air Force officers at Bethpage, New York, followed by flight demonstrations over the Adirondack Mountains and the Sierra Nevadas.

The U.S. Navy feels that these demonstrations accurately represented the capabilities and limitations of the E2C. We have no formal Pakistani reaction to the tests. Comments were made about the comparisons and characteristics of the radars on the E2C and the E3A. The Pakistan Air Force is concerned about the single engine performance at high altitude of the E2C and about certain aspects of the radar performance.

Overall, however, we feel that the Pakistan Air Force considers that the demonstrations here in the U.S. provided conditions that suitably replicated the terrain over which any AEW aircraft would have to operate along the Pak-Afghan border. We are willing to demonstrate the E2C in Pakistan should that be requested.

The proposed certification requirement is unnecessary. It might be viewed in Pakistan as an unsolicited and undesirable attempt to foist a largely irrelevant American political issue into what Pakistan would see as a sovereign decision-making process by its elected leaders and senior military officers.

We have urged that Pakistan make that decision based on the benefits of cost effectiveness and overall efficiency.

Question: Assess effectiveness of U.S. aid program to Pakistan. Principal achievements, principal shortcomings. What can be done to remedy those shortcomings?

Response: As I have stated earlier, the major achievements of our security assistance program have been intangible -- in building a sense of confidence, higher morale, and visible progress towards the goal of modernization of Pakistani forces armed largely with diverse and obsolescent equipment.

The provision of F-16 fighters, Cobra helicopters, HARPOON missiles, and M48A5 tanks has given each service substantial improvements in the respective inventories. To date these have been incorporated into the services without any major flaws or deficient results. The smooth and successful infusion, and the maturity and confidence now being exhibited at important field grade and senior officer level, are testament to the defensive nature of any U.S. security assistance program. We have no reason to believe and no evidence to justify that these items or future purchases are meant for helping build an arsenal that would definitely threaten any of Pakistan's neighbors. To think otherwise is a distortion of reality.

The principal shortcomings are that the historical animosities that plague relations between India and Pakistan are still existent at many levels of civilian and military life in both countries. Many Indians are convinced, despite all factual evidence of the balance of forces, that each sale of U.S. equipment to Pakistan automatically tilts the balance even further in Pakistan's favor, deepens the so-called arms race, and makes Pakistan by extension all the more brazen to launch an ill-advised attack. More rational and reasoned discourse on the issue of defense expenditures and military capabilities is needed to remedy this unfortunate impediment to improved relations.

Another obvious shortcoming is that our efforts to date have not led to a diminution of the hostile threat from Soviet and Soviet-backed forces in Afghanistan. Although some of our deliveries have been dedicated to the Afghan border, the nature of the threat and the terrain defy solutions short of a coordinated early warning, surveillance, and air defense network.

Question: How many more F-16s would Pakistan require to insure the inviolability of its borders?

Response: The exact definition of the word "inviolability" notwithstanding, we would estimate that with an effective and coordinated air defense network along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, including an airborne system for the most mountainous stretches near Peshawar, Pakistan does not need additional F-16s to insure its territorial integrity and airspace. If the question is meant to deal with both the Afghan frontier and the Indo-Pakistani border, and given the obsolescent Chinese F-6 aircraft and questionable performance of Mirage aircraft in Pakistan's inventory, an additional two squadrons (32 aircraft) would be needed to provide a degree of protection one might consider to be "inviolable".

As an aside, Pakistan has unofficially requested fewer than ten aircraft for the life of the next program as attrition aircraft. We have no plans to provide any more than this number.

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Question: What is likelihood of attempts by Soviet or Afghan authorities to destabilize Pakistan?

Response: As I have said before, we believe there is a clear pattern of intimidation and subversion in the multi-faceted Soviet and Afghan campaign presently occurring inside Pakistan. Infiltration of large numbers of subversive agents among the refugee population is an accepted fact of life. The bombings of vital national infrastructure targets are another element of this campaign. The recent truck bombing outside Peshawar, and the subsequent rioting in the city, are the latest and most dramatic evidence of the success of this campaign. The complex political situation in the Northwest Frontier Province, and to a lesser degree in Baluchistan and Sind Provinces, are not helped by such a continuing visible menace to Pakistani civilians. Narcotics trafficking through tribal areas closest to the border, especially in the NWFP, compound government control problems. The extent to which this newest, Soviet-inspired element is locally destabilizing is hard to quantify.

While the Afghan authorities on their own are virtually incapable of anything more than organizing and directing these localized and generally containable incidents, the Soviets have far greater flexibility and finances to expand any campaign into a broader destabilizing attempt. There is no firm evidence that they have chosen to embark on such a broad attempt, however.

Question: What is the likelihood of following events--
Soviet invasion of Pakistan?

Response: Extremely unlikely, probability zero.

Question: Soviet ground attack on Afghan refugee camps along
Afghan border?

Response: Again very unlikely, especially any ground attack on
camps situated within Pakistan. The political decision in
Moscow to undertake an attack into Pakistan would demolish the
careful diplomatic search for a formula for an Afghan government
that must be acceptable to the Soviets.

Question: Indian invasion of Pakistan?

Response: Extremely unlikely, again for political reasons.
Although there are some anomalies and ambiguities to the current
tactical locations of Indian Army units involved in their
exercise, there is a clear absence of political will or
justification in New Delhi to countenance any such act.

Question: Pakistani attack on India?

Response: Again we rate this extremely unlikely. Not only is
there no compelling reason for such an attack, there is no clear
convincing argument to be made in Islamabad for provoking India,
given the clear superiority India enjoys and the international
condemnation that would ensue.

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Question: What has been the effect on the military balance in South Asia of U.S. aid to Pakistan since 1981? Has U.S. military assistance strengthened Pakistan vis-a-vis USSR or India? Has U.S. military assistance threatened Indian security? If so, in what ways?

Response: The provision of U.S. aid to Pakistan has been a definite confidence builder for the Pakistani political leadership as well as its armed forces. It has helped enable Pakistan to approach contentious security issues in a more mature, responsible and confident manner. Pakistan has shown that it can be a positive force for moderation not only in South Asia but also among other parties that are involved in issues that affect the Muslim religion and other supra-regional matters. In South Asia, Pakistan has agreed to the drafting of agreements with India committing both to not attacking the other's nuclear power facilities and also to a no-war pact. Pakistan has embraced the South Asian Association or Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Despite local cross-border tensions during the first two months this year, Pakistan proposed bilateral talks at any level to negotiate a reduction of tensions. Upon India's acceptance of talks, Pakistan dispatched diplomats to New Delhi who reached quick agreement with their counterparts on methods to defuse the tension.

The provision of U.S. aid to Pakistan has not, however, changed the basic balance of forces in South Asia. The incremental infusions of U.S.-made equipment have their corresponding incremental changes in the South Asian order of battle, but U.S. aid since 1981 and for the foreseeable future has no significant impact on the military balance. Our aid to Pakistan cannot be characterized in any way as a threat to Indian security. In a recent article in the Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, a noted American expert, Professor Robert Wirsing, points out that current conventional weapons ratios in the subcontinent stand clearly in India's favor, although admitting that sheer "bean counts" convey a misleading impression. Nonetheless, Wirsing points out that India vastly outspends Pakistan, despite the fact that Pakistan devotes a far greater percentage of its GNP than India does to defense expenditures.

Question: Discuss problems Pakistan has with air incursions across western border, including specific details as to numbers, locations, depth of penetration, elapsed time in Pakistan airspace and fatalities and property damage inflicted by intruders. Are Soviets as well as Afghani pilots involved? What percentage of these incursions are deliberate provocations, what percentage possibly unintentional?

Response: The number of intrusions since the first of this year has skyrocketed -- over two hundred different intrusions in the first six weeks of 1987, roughly the same number as for all of 1985. In 1986 we recorded well over 700 incursions. One half of this year's incursions and one third of last year's number have been considered serious. We classify penetration deeper than five nautical miles or any attack that involves dropping ordnance or onboard weapons fire as serious. Even many minor intrusions are extended aerial reconnaissance. Given the resumption last week of indirect political talks at Geneva, we believe a clear pattern of Soviet intimidation and subversion exists in many of these intrusions, even the ones that target traditional infiltration routes into Afghanistan by the resistance fighters.

We have no definitive information on the extent of actual Soviet involvement if any in these incidents.

I have already described in rough figures the serious incidents included in the overall figures. Certainly those incidents that are deep penetrations, and those that cause destruction, cannot be entirely unintentional. In 1986 Pakistan lodged more than twenty formal protests over these provocative air attacks and artillery or tank shellings that caused at least 300 casualties inside Pakistan.

QUESTION: Are we planning to sell AWACS to Pakistan? Wouldn't this cause a major destabilization and arms race in that area?

ANSWER: The Administration is convinced that Pakistan needs a capability to improve its airborne early warning capability against the hundreds of aerial incursions every year from Afghanistan. The border is violated repeatedly by the Soviets and the puppet government in Afghanistan, often causing death, destruction, and misery inside Pakistan. We agree with the Pakistani assessment that they could deal much more effectively with these provocations, and help prevent such suffering inside Pakistan, if they had an airborne early warning platform.

We are not planning to sell any specific airborne early warning system to Pakistan. We have jointly studied the problem along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and have studied a number of airborne systems that might be considered. A sanitized version of the E-3A Sentry, commonly called AWACS, is one of those systems. Another would be a releasable version of the E-2C Hawkeye, made by Grumman. We are waiting for a formal request by the Government of Pakistan. We have strongly advised the Pakistani experts to weigh the cost-effectiveness of any system for the missions and situation unique to Pakistan.

Much of the writing and speculation about the technical characteristics of an AEW aircraft has been inaccurate, distorted, and at times grossly misleading. Each system has technical limitations; none can see as deeply and all-pervasively across borders as some critics charge. None has the "strategic battle management" or "force multiplier" capabilities that would automatically tilt the balance of forces in favor of the system operator. None can see ground force dispositions or vehicular configurations. None is an omniscient "eye-in-the-sky" strategic reconnaissance platform. All are based on the principle of radar detection of airborne moving targets flying within the radius of the radar performance.

Increasingly, nations of the world are recognizing the need to upgrade their air defense systems. The protection of Pakistani airspace and territorial integrity are vital to the continued existence of Pakistan, and to that country's commitment to the heroic Afghan resistance.

Pakistan has no other less-expensive way, short of acquiring an AEW aircraft; to react in time to counter the increasing numbers of hostile and deliberate tactics aimed at coercing Pakistan to end its support of the brave Afghan people.

Question: Describe Soviet military presence in Afghanistan, particularly with reference to implications for Pakistani security. What impact would a substantial reduction in US aid to Pakistan have on Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan? On Soviet policy toward Pakistan?

Response: The Soviets continue to deploy an estimated 116,000 combat troops in Afghanistan. The Soviets continue to launch operations countrywide of varying sizes and duration to destroy the resistance. The Soviets continue to attempt, and continue to fail, to mold the Afghan Army into a more effective fighting force. Desertions, heavy casualties, low morale, and distrust bordering on hatred for the Soviets plague the Afghan Army. Soviet tactics in Afghanistan have evolved to adjust to the unique counterinsurgency there. But the war continues to be a mobile stalemate. Neither side is capable at present force levels of decisively defeating the other. The cost to both sides increases.

Pakistan's security remains threatened, as the numbers of air incidents and ground shellings suggest. Lives are being lost and property destroyed inside Pakistan, from these overt acts and from well-orchestrated campaigns of terror and sabotage in the border areas and in the major population centers like Peshawar.

A substantial reduction of aid to Pakistan would probably force a thorough reassessment in Islamabad of the advantages and disadvantages of the present position of defying the Soviet occupation. An overnight termination of support to the resistance would be highly improbable, but the domestic frictions now evident in Pakistan against the government's policy would likely exacerbate. More and more violent incidents involving the Afghan refugees would likely occur. Pakistan would have to be deeply concerned about the presence of so many armed Afghan resistance fighters who would want to maintain some sanctuary inside Pakistan despite a change of official policy. A hypothetical yet plausible scenario caused by our refusal to support Pakistan might involve the not-entirely-voluntary repatriation of millions of Afghans, with unpredictable consequences inside Pakistan, especially in the tribal areas where government control is always tenuous.

The impact of a substantial reduction of aid to Pakistan on Soviet policy would be immediate. The alternating swings between the carrot and the stick would become more pronounced than ever. Propaganda and proselytizing to accept a solution on Moscow's terms would likely intensify inside Pakistan, definitely encouraged if not directly assisted by the Soviets. Any semblance of the current government in Islamabad would be pressured to accept a solution in Afghanistan heavily in favor of Soviet goals.

QUESTION: Why should we offer a major new five-year program to Pakistan when we have not got them to stop their nuclear weapons development?

ANSWER: As I have stated, our security relationship with Pakistan is designed to modernize its armed forces, to give those forces better equipment and overall capability to deter potential Soviet adventurism from Afghanistan, especially provocative and often destructive air incursions of Pakistani airspace and territory.

We continue to urge Pakistan to refrain from nuclear weapons progress. Most Pakistanis feel that to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty without simultaneous action by India would put Pakistan at a decided disadvantage. Pakistan has stated frequently that it is prepared to sign the non-proliferation treaty immediately once the Indians agree to sign. The leaders of both countries have solemnly pledged, and we believe that pledge, not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. These are steps in the right direction. Pakistan is well aware that access to this second aid program requires Congressional renewal of the Symington Amendment waiver that prohibits aid for countries engaged in unsafeguarded nuclear activities.

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Question: Describe and evaluate impact of recent Pakistani weapons acquisitions from U.S. on Soviet and Indian attitudes. How and where have Pakistanis deployed these weapons?

Response: This is a difficult question to address with any degree of certainty. The life of the current program and the cumulative effect over time on the attitudes of the Soviets and Indians make it hard to say exactly how those attitudes have changed. The Pakistanis do know that our aid does not come without strings. We have assurances repeatedly from the Government of Pakistan that any U.S. weapons sold under the security assistance program will not be used for offensive purposes against India. We have no reason, let me stress no reason, to question these assurances. The infusion of weapons under the first aid program made modest improvements in the overall military capabilities of the Pakistan armed forces. As I have said elsewhere, those infusions have not and will not change the basic military balance on the subcontinent that currently is weighted heavily in India's favor.

The Pakistanis have deployed the major purchase under the first aid program, the forty F-16 fighter aircraft, to two different airfields, one well within a hundred miles of the Afghan frontier. The other airfield at Sargodha is about a hundred miles from the Indian border and about 180 miles from the Afghan border. Sargodha is the major Pakistani Air Force base for the entire F-16 program and has served as the main focus of the F-16 integration into the PAF.

Other Pakistan acquisitions, including Cobra helicopters, TOW antitank missiles, STINGER anti-aircraft missiles, and other items have to varying degrees been deployed to units with direct responsibilities for defense along the Afghan border. Such weapons as M48A5 tanks, armored personnel carriers, and heavier self-propelled howitzers have been inducted into Pakistani Army field units and not deployed directly to the unique defense of the Afghan border. This in no way is any confirmation that these weapons therefore have been deployed directly to the Indian border. The field units in their traditional cantonments have national defense priorities against threats from any direction, from not only India and Afghanistan but also Iran, China, and the Soviet Union through the Wakhan Corridor in northeastern Afghanistan.

Question: FMS: What other weapons systems have Pakistanis expressed interest in? Are they going to request M1A1 tanks? What are the financial implications of unofficial Pakistani shopping list?

Response: For the new six-year program, Pakistan has expressed interest in the following major purchases:

an airborne early warning system, aerostat (tethered balloon) radars, armored personnel carriers, modern U.S. tanks, F-16 fighter aircraft, naval air defense gun systems, self-propelled howitzers, counter-battery artillery and mortar radars, P-3 maritime surveillance aircraft, and MLRS (Multiple Launched Rocket System). Pakistan has earmarked 15% of the FMS component under the new program for defense industrial cooperation projects.

Pakistan has not specifically requested M1A1 tanks in this program. Their military planners realize the need to upgrade a tank force that is overwhelmingly 1950s vintage Chinese-made armor. Pakistan has purchased some M48A5 tanks under the first program, but the debate in Pakistan over the decision on what specific tank or mix of tanks to request under this program has apparently not been made.